I. INTRODUCTION
For many years, scientists have searched for biological markers of the brain deterioration associated with the cognitive impairments characterizing Alzheimer's disease (AD). Although the search for useful biomarkers is ongoing, there is increasing evidence that certain brain changes indicate that a person is at relatively high risk of developing full-blown AD.
Much of the research on AD biomarkers is motivated by the belief that successful treatment will require very early intervention in the disease process. Unfortunately, by the time people develop the memory and other behavioral problems that are associated with AD, significant brain damage has already occurred. Biomarker tests could give patients and clinicians the opportunity to start drug and other treatments early, with the goal of slowing or stopping the deterioration that can eventually produce the clinical symptoms of AD. 1 We can all hope that the medical promise of AD biomarkers becomes a reality. But it will take years to determine whether biomarker testing and early intervention produce clear health benefits.
Currently available AD treatments are largely ineffective, and early therapeutic intervention remains unproven. Before effective treatment becomes available, many people tested for biomarkers could learn that they are at higher-thanaverage risk of developing AD. Some people will appreciate this early warning, for it will give them an opportunity to get their affairs in order, take a long-desired vacation, and "have the kind of heartfelt talks with their children that that people often put off." 2 But for most people, the early warning will be disturbing news. Indeed, a few recent surveys suggest that AD is replacing cancer as the most-feared disease among Americans. 3 As I discuss below, people alarmed at the possibility of losing their mental abilities might act to avoid a future with AD. Some people might resort to pre-emptive suicide after receiving their biomarker test results. Others might make advance treatment directives refusing all life-sustaining interventions and even ordinary food and water if they become cognitively impaired and unable to make their own medical choices.
People living in places that permit physician-assisted suicide and active euthanasia might seek medical assistance in dying, either right away or later, through an advance directive requesting death when they exhibit certain AD symptoms.
In short, AD biomarkers create new end-of-life issues for individuals, medical professionals, and policy makers. In Part I of this essay, I describe current research findings on AD biomarkers and their implications for end-of-life 2 Id. at 792. 3 4 One major biomarker test involves measuring beta-amyloid and tau levels in a person's spinal fluid. 5 The other major test uses magnetic resonance and positron emission tomography (PET) imaging to assess structural changes and the presence of beta-amyloid in the brain. Alzheimer's disease is a subset of the broader disease category called dementia. The biomarker tests I describe in this article apply to AD alone, not to all forms of dementia. Although most experts believe that the plaques and tangles associated with beta-amyloid and tau underlie AD symptoms, autopsies of cognitively normal older people reveal that many have plaques and tangles in their brains. 8 This means that they either die of other causes before the brain pathology produces symptoms, or that other protective factors involving genes, environmental conditions, or brain or cognitive "reserve" prevent the brain pathology from affecting their thinking. 9 The ongoing evaluation of AD research findings has generated new diagnostic classifications. Many experts use a classification called mild cognitive impairment to refer to people who have episodic memory impairment, but not the more severe deficits required for a diagnosis of AD. 10 three labels are applied to people who could eventually develop AD symptoms, but could also live for many years and perhaps the rest of their lives without doing so. A study published in 2013 illustrates the situation. 13 In this study, researchers evaluated 311 study participants sixty-five years or older over a five-year period. Eleven percent of the participants who scored within the normal range on cognitive testing, but had abnormal levels of betaamyloid, developed measurable cognitive decline five years after the test. Twenty-six percent of the participants with normal cognitive function, but abnormal levels of both betaamyloid and tau, showed some mental decline during the five-year period. These progression rates were much higher than the progression rates of participants in the control group, who were cognitively normal people with normal amyloid and tau levels. Just two percent of the participants in that group showed some mental decline after five years. 14 Although study participants with positive biomarker tests and normal cognitive test scores were found to be at higher risk of developing AD, most of these participants scored within the normal range on cognitive assessments five years after biomarker testing.
The results were markedly different for study participants who initially had both abnormal beta-amyloid and tau levels and subtle mental decline.
After five years, fifty-six percent of participants in that group received cognitive test scores consistent with AD. 15 Although the expert community is divided, there is increasing support for the use of biomarkers as a diagnostic aid when people are also exhibiting the cognitive symptoms characterizing AD. 16 In a 2014 Journal of Medical Ethics article, bioethicist Dena Davis described and defended such a response. 21 She gave several reasons why someone might prefer suicide over a probable future with AD. People might want their assets to go to relatives or charitable organizations, rather than to the workers and facilities that provide dementia care. People might also want to protect their loved ones from the burdens that AD can impose on others. 22 People who see life with mental impairment as a "loss of self" 23 and an affront to their dignity may prefer death in the near future over longer survival with the prospect of AD. 24 Davis also pointed out that unlike people diagnosed with other serious diseases like cancer or HIV, people with positive AD biomarker tests cannot postpone suicide until they actually experience unwanted symptoms. Suicide 
MED. ETHICS 543 (2014).
22 Of course, a person's decision to commit pre-emptive suicide could impose burdens on families, too. 23 Stephen Post, Physician-Assisted Suicide in Alzheimer's Disease, 45 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 647 (1997).
24 Indeed, one philosopher has argued that the "soon-to-be demented" have a duty to commit suicide before losing their dignity as moral agents. Dennis Cooley, A Kantian Moral Duty for the Soon-to-BeDemented to Commit Suicide, 7 AM. J. BIOETHICS 37 (2007 anticipatory beliefs fail to recognize our ability to adapt as well as how much the circumstances of impairment affect our ability to flourish").
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Nevertheless, I agree with Davis's claim that biomarker tests could lead some people to commit suicide to avoid a future with AD. There is some evidence suggesting that receiving an actual AD diagnosis raises the risk of suicide, although it appears that many of those suicides occur in people who are also clinically depressed. 28 In my view, legal measures to completely prevent pre-emptive suicide would be morally unjustified, as well as impractical. Such measures would involve unacceptable and unworkable deprivations of liberty, such as confinement or continuous monitoring of individuals at risk for AD. At the same time, however, certain policy measures could discourage impulsive and uninformed suicide attempts based on AD biomarker results. In the concluding part of this essay, I describe such measures.
B. Advance Treatment Refusals
Advance treatment directives refusing all life-sustaining interventions are another potential response to AD biomarker testing. Through an advance directive, mentally competent individuals can make choices about the future treatment they want to receive as incompetent patients. They can, for example, give instructions that they should not receive any treatment for life-threatening medical conditions if they develop AD and can no longer make contemporaneous treatment decisions.
Positive biomarker test results could provoke some people to make advance directives refusing any treatment that could extend their lives with AD. Since the 1990s, there has been a lively discussion about the ethical issues raised by this kind of advance directive. According to some scholars, such as Ronald Dworkin, directives like this should be followed, even if they conflict with a patient's contemporaneous best interests. 29 
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Vol. 12:2 moral weight than do the welfare interests of a mentally incapacitated individual. 30 Thus, he wrote, the law should permit people "who are repelled by the idea of living demented, totally dependent lives, speaking gibberish" to direct that "if they become permanently and seriously demented and then develop a serious illness, they should not be given medical treatment except to avoid pain." 31 In defending this view, Dworkin gave an example of a case in which such a directive should be followed. The case involved a patient named Margo. Margo had been the subject of an article by a medical student, Andrew Firlik, who had come to know Margo in the course of his training. 32 Margo appeared to enjoy music and art therapy classes; she also seemed pleased when Firlik visited, although she never called him by name. Although she had lost much of her memory and needed assistance with many activities, Firlik concluded that Margo was "undeniably one of the happiest people I have known." 33 Dworkin asked readers to imagine that Margo had previously prepared an advance directive stating that if she developed AD, "she should not receive treatment for any other serious life-threatening disease she might contract." 34 That directive should govern Margo's care, Dworkin declared, even if she was currently living a life that gave her satisfaction and pleasure. 35 Her wishes as a competent person should take priority over her current interests as an incompetent dementia patient, he argued. 36 In contrast, a second group of scholars supports limiting the power that advance directives have over AD patient 30 Id. 31 Id. The quotation suggests that pain avoidance was the one welfare interest of dementia patients that Dworkin believed should be care. This group acknowledges that advance directives can be useful in addressing treatment questions, for directives often refuse treatment that would not serve the patient's current welfare interests. For example, advance directives refusing burdensome interventions like chemotherapy and surgery often promote an AD patient's welfare, because such interventions impose pain and distress on a person who cannot understand or remember why they are being done. But sometimes a minimally burdensome treatment, such as an oral antibiotic, can allow an AD patient like Margo to continue a life of apparent contentment. Such patients no longer remember the values that led them to refuse treatment in this situation, and they remain able to engage in activities and interactions that they enjoy. 37 I and others are unconvinced that an individual's former wish to avoid such a state should always take priority over her current interests in continuing a life that she appears to value. 38 In other contexts, law and policy recognize that people with mental disabilities can have lives of meaning and worth. The legal and ethical question is whether the rules governing advance directives should incorporate, or reject, this moral judgment.
Should competent people have absolute authority over the future care they receive as AD 37 Philosopher Agnieszka Jaworska developed the concept of "capacity to value" to describe some AD patients' retention of a basic capacity for autonomy.
Jaworska believes that such patients' contemporaneous preferences and interests are a form of autonomy that patients, or should legal rules and professional standards set limits on that authority?
To date, courts and other authorities have not directly addressed the issue I have described. Relatively few people make advance treatment directives containing precise instructions for future treatment, and I have not heard or read about an actual directive like the one Dworkin described. 39 A few courts have mandated medical nutrition and hydration for conscious incapacitated patients who previously made informal remarks suggesting that they would oppose such treatment. But none of these cases involved a formal advance directive refusing all lifesustaining measures as an incapacitated patient. 40 In the coming years, clinicians and courts are likely to encounter advance directives presenting conflicts between a dementia patient's past wishes and current interests. The baby boom generation is aging, and many in this group are both insistent on controlling their future medical care and terrified by the prospect of dementia. The results of AD biomarker tests could lead some of them to make a directive like the one Dworkin envisioned.
C. Advance Refusals of Food and Water
People disturbed by their AD biomarker test results might also look to a new form of advance directive to avoid life with dementia. In a recent article, Paul Menzel and Collette Chandler-Cramer argue that clinicians and legal authorities should recognize advance refusals of not only life-prolonging medical interventions, but also of spoonfeeding and other assistance with ordinary eating and drinking. 41 This advance directive would be a valuable tool for individuals seeking to avoid a lingering death with dementia, they say. The directive Menzel and Chandler-Cramer propose would apply only to patients in the late stages of AD, when patients require assistance with nearly every activity, including eating and drinking. These authors see advanced dementia as the final stage of life. By the time patients become "indifferent" to food, they are unable to walk, converse, or recognize their loved ones. At that point, Menzel and Chandler-Cramer contend, the patients' interests in survival are small enough that the decision to withhold food and water fails to present a threat to their welfare.
Menzel and Chandler-Cramer offer several justifications for their proposal. Besides arguing that the law should respect the competent individual's interest in controlling future care, they describe evidence indicating that death due to lack of nutrition and hydration is relatively comfortable. The law permits competent patients to hasten death by refusing to eat and drink, they observe, so why not allow people to do so in advance?
I agree that such a directive would be appealing to people intent on avoiding the lengthy decline and severe incapacities that characterize late-stage dementia. But in a commentary on the proposal, I raised questions about its legality. 42 Although the law permits competent patients to refuse ordinary food and water, no statute or court decision recognizes the competent person's right to make an advance directive refusing assistance with eating and drinking. 43 Imposing tube feeding on an objecting competent patient is a clear and massive intrusion on that person's liberty and bodily integrity. In contrast, giving a dementia patient help with ordinary eating and drinking fails to constitute such a serious intrusion, even if the individual previously refused such help. It is not clear that legal authorities will equate advance refusals of assistance with eating and drinking with competent patients' contemporaneous refusals of food and water. The proposal also raises ethical concerns, for it could compromise the welfare of some dementia patients. Menzel and Chandler-Cramer describe a patient named Shari as one candidate for their approach. Before she was diagnosed with AD, Shari made an advance directive refusing assisted feeding as an advanced AD patient.
Shari now has advanced AD, is incontinent, and cannot "walk, feed herself, or chew and swallow." 44 With spoon-feeding and encouragement, however, she swallows nutritional smoothies. And Shari "occasionally appears to get pleasure from the smoothies and she seldom expresses distress or discomfort." 45 Despite that fact that Shari accepts nourishment, Menzel and Chandler-Cramer believe that nourishment should be withheld based on her advance directive. My concern is that a patient like Shari could experience distress and discomfort if no one offers her the smoothies she is accustomed to receiving. Shari is not an AD patient who resists eating or experiences choking or other distressing effects when she tries to swallow. Withholding food and water from such a patient is defensible on grounds that it maintains the patient's comfort. But that defense doesn't apply in cases like Shari's. Before allowing withholding in such cases, it will be necessary to examine the burdens withholding could impose on a patient like Shari.
Despite these concerns, people with positive AD biomarker test results could advocate for the right to make directives like the one Menzel and Chandler-Cramer propose. With the availability of biomarker test results, clinicians and policy makers could face increased pressure to permit and enforce such directives. Requests for physician-assisted death are an additional potential response to AD biomarker testing. Legal authorities in the United States have not recognized a right to medically assisted death for anyone at risk of or diagnosed with AD. A few states have legalized physicianassisted suicide, but only for terminally ill competent patients with six months or less to live. 46 It is a different story in the Netherlands, however. That nation has a liberal law governing access to medically assisted death, one that permits physician-assisted suicide and active euthanasia in a wide range of situations.
Two requirements in the Dutch law would appear to disqualify AD patients from eligibility for assisted death. The law permits physicians to respond only to requests that are "voluntary and well considered" made by people experiencing "the situation as 'unbearable' and one of 'hopeless suffering.'" 47 Studies have found that most Dutch physicians are unwilling to follow advance directives requesting euthanasia for AD, citing "difficulty determining the suffering of the patient and determining the exact moment" to carry out the advance directive. 48 Coping mechanisms lead many early AD patients to downplay the problems they are experiencing, and as the disease progresses, people become completely unaware of those problems. As one group of Dutch clinicians put it, in the typical patient, "the realization of having dementia is 46 progressively lacking from the patient's subjective experience and hence it is impossible for someone in an advanced stage of dementia to appreciate the situation as 'unbearable and hopeless.'" 49 Nevertheless, Dutch physicians have performed euthanasia for people in the early stages of AD. 50 And in 2011, a woman with advanced AD was euthanized based on a request contained in her advance directive, a directive that was made five years after her AD diagnosis. 51 Officials approved euthanasia in these cases, despite doubts about the decision-making capacity of the AD patients and questions about whether the patients were actually experiencing unbearable suffering. 52 In light of this nation's conservative position on assisted death, U.S. clinicians and officials are unlikely to face these issues in the near future. But given the "Alzheimerphobia" 53 that also exists in this country, U.S. clinicians and officials may eventually confront demands to allow medically assisted death for people with early-stage AD, as well as for people in later stages of the disease based on their requests contained in advance directives. 54 The approach asks others to value what people with dementia are able to do, such as live in the moment and respond to others with an honesty unseen among cognitively "normal" people. 67 By trying to see the world through the eyes of a person with AD, caregivers seek to provide an environment that is pleasant and comfortable for that person. 68 People with positive biomarker tests need an accurate picture of what life with AD involves before they make endof-life choices based on their test results. Although AD is a frightening prospect, some of that fear is based on a lack of understanding of what life can be like for people with AD. Implementing Kitwood's patient-centered care approach is part of a broader national and worldwide task: to respond to the growing population of people affected by AD and other forms of dementia. This demographic development presents immense ethical, medical, financial, legal, and social challenges, in this country and the rest of the world. 69 Determining the proper role of AD biomarkers in end-of-life choices will be one of these challenges. 
